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Regulating the Regulators
W. Kip Viscusit
I. OVERSIGHT IN A WORLD OF FINANCIAL LIMITS
Since the 1970s, there has been a tremendous growth in
government regulation pertaining to risk and the environment.
These efforts have emerged quite legitimately because market
processes alone cannot fully address risk-related concerns.'
Without some kind of regulation or liability, for example, firms
lack appropriate incentives to restrict their pollution. Similarly,
when products or activities are extremely risky, if people are not
cognizant of the risks they face, the firms generating the hazards
may not have adequate incentives to issue warnings. To solve
these problems, regulatory agencies have mounted a wide variety
of efforts to improve the quality of the air we breathe, the water
we drink, the products we use, and the workplaces where we toil.
Notwithstanding the legitimate impetus for these regulatory
activities, government agencies sometimes overstep their bounds.
The presence of market failure creates a potential role for gov-
ernment action, but this action must be well conceived. A clearly
misguided and unduly burdensome regulation certainly would
not be in society's best interest even if it were intended to ad-
dress a legitimate social problem. As in other policy contexts, the
task is to structure regulatory efforts to promote society's welfare
as effectively as possible.
The importance of this task stems from the need to ensure
that the substantial overall cost of regulatory policies is justified.
Estimates suggest that total annual regulatory costs are in the
vicinity of $400 to $500 billion.' Of this amount, approximately
$100 billion comprises transfers that do not create a net efficien-
t John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. The
author was the Deputy Director of the President's Council on Wage and Price Stability,
which was responsible for White House oversight of new regulations in the Carter Admin-
istration, from 1979-81, and is a current member of two United States Environmental
Protection Agency Science Advisory Boards.
See generally W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.,
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (MIT 2d ed 1995).
2 Id at 34.
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cy loss. The remaining $300 to $400 billion is divided between
paperwork costs and other regulatory expenses. It is particularly
noteworthy that the estimated annual cost of environmental
regulations alone is $124 billion.'
Although these estimates show that regulatory costs are not
trivial, the price tag could become even greater. Unfortunately,
much more remains to be done if our objective is a risk-free soci-
ety. Indeed, even if the entire gross domestic product were allo-
cated to preventing accidental deaths, we would have available
less than $60 million per fatality to be prevented.4 Moreover, if
we allocated all of our resources to preventing accidental deaths,
we would have nothing left to spend to prevent cancer, or to
provide food, housing, medical care, and so on. In short, regulato-
ry expenditures could easily outstrip society's ability to pay.
Eventually we must draw the line on how much we wish to allo-
cate for risk regulation, environmental protection, and other
regulatory programs. The questions are: how far should we go in
these efforts, and how should we choose among them?
In some cases, an absolutist commitment to a zero-risk level
may not only be unduly expensive, but it may also prove counter-
productive. In specifying the requirements for an updated com-
puterized air traffic control system, the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration ("FAA7) insisted that such a system have a reliability of
99.99999 percent ("seven nines" reliability). This system would
only fail three seconds per year on average. Some observers be-
lieve that the contractual requirements the FAA stipulated for
IBM, the system's designer, violated the laws of physics.' The
commitment to perfection paralyzed the updating of the air traf-
fic control system and led to the old system's remaining in place,
thereby leading to a higher risk than would have existed had a
more flexible approach been adopted.6
Although the Executive Office of the President has long exer-
cised formal oversight to foster sounder regulation, these efforts
have not been entirely successful because they have occasionally
' Thomas D. Hopkins, The Costs of Federal Regulation, 2 J Reg & Soc Costs 16
(1992).
" W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 5 (Ox-
ford 1992).
' For a full description of this policy approach and its limitations, see Matthew L.
Wald, Ambitious Update of Air Navigation Becomes a Fiasco, NY Times Al, All (Jan 29,
1996).
6 "The FAA. is so risk averse, it is shod with this idea, 'We can't field anything
until it's absolutely perfect.'" Id (reporting statement of Thomas C. Richards, an FAA
Administrator under President Bush).
1424 [63:1423
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1424 1996
Regulating the Regulators
conflicted with agencies' legislative mandates. In hopes of estab-
lishing a consistent basis for assessing and selecting regulations,
the current Congress has considered a series of bills designed to
promote more effective regulations.7 In some instances, these
were omnibus bills that pertained to regulatory policy in general.
Such broad-based reforms would supersede agencies' legislative
mandates, impose benefit-cost tests, and alter the manner in
which risks are assessed. Other more narrowly framed bills ei-
ther would leave existing legislative mandates intact or else
would simply reform the regulatory approach to a specific class of
policies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
hazardous waste cleanup programs under Superfund.8 Which
directions should be selected for regulatory policy and which tests
are most important will be the focus of this Essay.
The guiding principle underlying the policy prescriptions
advocated here is that government agencies should select those
policies that are in society's best interest. Honest risk assessment
and benefit-cost balancing should be our guides. After reviewing
the existing legislative mandates of regulatory agencies and the
role of government oversight, this Essay will explore several
techniques for assessing regulatory policies, including benefit-cost
analysis, cost-effectiveness tests, risk assessment, and risk-risk
analysis. Each of these methodological approaches provides a
different perspective on the merits of regulatory policies. These
techniques are reflected in various current oversight guidelines
and in guidelines proposed by various bills.
Many reformers have encountered political difficulties. Per-
haps this is because many of their proposals are overly excessive
grab bags of institutional and substantive reforms, while other
proposals have failed to recognize the underlying deficiencies in
agencies' legislative mandates. Improving regulatory efficiency
will remain a salient policy objective so long as society devotes
considerable resources to these efforts, and the fate of any cur-
rent or future piece of legislation will not affect its underlying
importance.
' For discussion of these bills, see notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
' The legislation also could, for example, impose benefit-cost tests in the setting of
drinking water standards or other narrowly defined environmental objectives rather than
an omnibus approach that revamps all EPA activities.
1996] 1425
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II. THE EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE MANDATES ON REGULATORY
POLICY
It is somewhat ironic that Congress has taken the initiative
in putting regulatory policies on sounder footing. Many of the
problems are of Congress's own making. The underlying difficul-
ties stem primarily from past congressional actions and legisla-
tion that circumscribed the character of regulatory policies and
limited attempts to balance regulation equitably. Congress, of
course, has not assumed the responsibility for drafting specific
regulations, though there are some exceptions, such as the ciga-
rette labeling requirements.' For the most part, the role of Con-
gress has been to define broadly the legislative objectives of regu-
latory agencies. The agencies then implement these objectives
subject to judicial review and the review process established
within the Executive Office of the President.
One potential check on excessive regulation is judicial re-
view. However, the success of a legal challenge to a regulation is
not based on its overall economic merits but rather on whether
the agency adhered to its legislative mandate in promulgating
the regulation. In many instances the legislation has defined the
mission of the agency so narrowly that tradeoffs between regula-
tory costs and risk reduction objectives are not permitted. The
Clean Air Act, for example, specifically precludes the consider-
ation of costs in the setting of national ambient air quality stan-
dards.' ° Indeed, no legislative mandates specifically require that
an agency show that the economic benefits exceed the costs of a
regulation, and in most instances there are specific provisions
that could give the agency administrator the leeway to avoid
such explicit balancing. Even if balancing is not required, if
tradeoffs were explicitly permitted, administrators would have
the option of promulgating more reasonable policies. Perhaps
more important, OMB could better pressure them into doing so.
Most of the original controversy surrounding legislative man-
dates to regulatory agencies derived from litigation over proposed
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regula-
tions. The restrictive terms of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 are similar to those of other agency legislative
mandates in that the Act does not urge the agency to balance the
9 15 USC § 1333 (1994) (specifying exact wording and format of warning labels).
10 See Lead Industries Association v EPA, 647 F2d 1130, 1148-51 (DC Cir 1980)
(interpreting 42 USC § 7409 (1988) to prohibit consideration of feasibility in setting air
quality standards).
1426 [63:1423
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benefits and costs of its safety regulations and adopt those reg-
ulations that achieve the greatest net gain to society. Rather, the
Act sets the agency on a single-minded mission "to assure so far
as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions."" The agency, of course, does
not have unbridled discretion. For example, the Act also requires
that the tasks imposed by OSHA regulations be "feasible."'
Nevertheless, nothing establishes any necessary relationship
between the benefits derived from the regulation and the costs
imposed on society.
The first major challenge to OSHA's narrow interpretation of
its legislative mandate was the 1980 Supreme Court decision
involving the OSHA benzene standard. 3 Although that decision
did not resolve the benefit-cost tradeoff issue, it did hold that the
agency cannot require employers to take costly measures that
merely eliminate trivial hazards but instead must show that the
hazards pose a significant risk to human health and thus the
standards are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide
safe or healthful employment." 4 The Court specifically noted
that it may not be socially desirable to eliminate trivial risks:
But 'safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' There are many
activities that we engage in every day-such as driving a car
or even breathing city air-that entail some risk of accident
or material health impairment; nevertheless, few people
would consider these activities "unsafe." Similarly, a
workplace can hardly be considered "unsafe" unless it
threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm. 5
How small is too small to merit regulation is still an unre-
solved issue. From an economic-efficiency standpoint, it may be
desirable to regulate even a minuscule risk if the cost of reducing
the risk is correspondingly small. What matters is the balance
between risks and costs, not necessarily the magnitude of the
risk. Nevertheless, how we think about the magnitude of the risk
and how we estimate this magnitude are also important. Much of
the recent regulatory reform legislation before Congress is specifi-
" Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590,
codified at 29 USC § 651(b) (1994).
29 USC § 655(bX5) (1994).
13 Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US
607 (1980).
14 Id at 642.
15 Id.
1996] 1427
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cally concerned with this risk-assessment issue since distortions
in the assessment of risk produce a misleading index of the mer-
its of the regulatory policy.
The next principal Supreme Court case on regulatory author-
ity was the 1981 decision regarding the OSHA cotton dust stan-
dard. 6 That standard had been challenged by the textile indus-
try as unduly burdensome and not reflecting an appropriate bal-
ance of benefits and costs. The Court ruled that the agency was
not required to adopt a benefit-cost test. It interpreted the
agency's legislative mandate in terms of whether the regulation
was "capable of being done" rather than interpreting feasibility in
terms of obtaining an appropriate safety payoff from regulatory
costs.'
Although OSHA is not required to adopt a benefit-cost test, a
1991 decision of the D.C. Circuit indicated that OSHA may nev-
ertheless have the leeway to incorporate more balancing in the
setting of regulatory standards than it has in the past. 8 The
court interpreted one provision of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act permissively, finding that it could reasonably be read
to require the balancing of benefits and costs.' 9 In a concurring
opinion, Judge Stephen Williams outlined a new test for regula-
tory policy-risk-risk analysis-that suggests that some regula-
tions that are inordinately burdensome and that do not produce
very substantial benefits in return for substantial costs may in
fact have a net adverse effect on public health." Risk-risk anal-
ysis will be considered in greater detail below.
The primary message from the various relevant court deci-
sions is that administrative agencies enjoy wide discretion to set
regulations in whatever manner they choose, since their legisla-
tive mandates usually neither prescribe nor forbid specific eco-
nomic-policy tests. For example, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 concerned a challenge to the
EPA's "bubble policy," which permitted firms to treat air pollu-
tion as if an artificial bubble surrounded the plant. Rather than
complying with specific air pollution requirements for each
1 American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v Donovan, 452 US 490 (1981).
17 Id at 508-09.
18 See International Union, UAW v OSHA, 938 F2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991).
19 Id at 1318-21.
20 International Union, 938 F2d at 1326 (Williams concurring). This approach is also
called health-health analysis. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Trade-
offs, 63 U Chi L Rev 1533 (1996).
21 467 US 837 (1984).
[63:14231428
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smokestack at the plant, firms could, in effect, examine the total
emissions within the bubble and then select the most cost-effec-
tive means of reaching a specific air pollution target. Although
the applicability of the bubble policy was limited to situations
specifically approved by the agency, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council ("NRDC") nevertheless challenged the flexibility
offered by EPA. Whereas previous court challenges had suggested
that regulatory agencies had interpreted their legislative man-
dates too narrowly, the NRDC's challenge suggested that the
EPA had interpreted its mandate too broadly, in too balanced a
fashion. In particular, it gave firms flexibility in selecting the
most cost-effective means for reducing pollution rather than re-
quiring that every emissions source meet a stringent pollution
standard. In Chevron, the Supreme Court ruled that agencies
may interpret ambiguities in their legislative mandates in a
reasonable manner, and so long as they are doing so, courts will
not interfere with the agencies' interpretations. 2
Because Chevron mandates this deferential standard of re-
view, those attempting to reform regulatory policy cannot rely on
existing legislative mandates to constrain agency action. As I will
demonstrate below by examining specific regulatory policies,
agencies have largely used their restrictive legislative mandates
as shields to prevent judicial challenges to regulations as well as
to resist internal administration efforts to achieve reasonable
benefit-cost balancing. The regulatory reform bills before the
104th Congress consequently can serve as a mechanism for
placing regulatory policies on more solid footing.
III. THE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT PROCESS
Regulatory agencies respond to their own constituencies
within the constraints imposed by their legislative mandates and
the statutes they enforce. Because agencies' parochial interests
do not necessarily reflect national interests, the past six presi-
dents have launched formal efforts to monitor and influence regu-
latory policies. President Nixon instituted "quality of life" reviews
to examine the economic costs of regulations, a process that was
formalized under the Ford administration.23 President Ford es-
tablished a new agency within the Executive Office of the
President, the Council on Wage and Price Stability, that would
2 Id at 842-45.
2 See Exec Order No 11821, 3 CFR 926 (1974).
1996] 1429
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oversee new regulatory policies and file comments in the public
record on behalf of the Administration.' This oversight group
did not, however, have any formal veto power over regulatory
policy. President Carter continued this process, adding a re-
quirement that regulations must be cost-effective.' In their in-
flationary impact analyses, agencies had to show that the "least
burdensome of the acceptable alternatives has been chosen."26
These tests did not require that the benefits of regulations
exceed the costs. President Reagan, however, did impose such a
requirement and altered the institutional mechanism for regula-
tory review, shifting responsibility to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") in the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB"), where it remains." The Reagan approach stip-
ulated that "[r]egulatory actions shall not be undertaken unless
the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the
potential costs to society."28 This requirement was not, however,
binding in instances where the agency's legislative mandate
ruled out a benefit-cost test, 9 which unfortunately is the norm
for most risk- and environmental-regulation agencies.
This structure remained intact under the Bush administra-
tion and has continued in place with only slight modification
under the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration
changed the wording of the Executive Order, making it clear that
not all regulatory benefits and costs can be monetized and that
nonmonetary consequences should be influential as well.3" Presi-
dent Clinton also greatly expanded the openness of the review
process and increased the disclosure requirements.3
The degree to which these benefit-cost tests lack binding
force is exemplified in the profile of regulatory policies in Table 1.
Let us take as our reference point for desirable regulatory poli-
cies an implicit value of $5 million per life saved, which is the
wage-risk tradeoff reflected in worker decisions. 2 Put somewhat
differently, if a worker is facing an average annual job risk of
2 See Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub L No 93-387, 88 Stat 750 (1974),
codified as amended at 12 USC § 1904 (1976).
25 See Exec Order No 12044, 3 CFR 152 (1978).
26 Id § 2(d)(3), 3 CFR at 154.
27 Exec Order No 12291, 3 CFR 127 (1981).
SId § 2(b), 3 CFR at 128.
29 Id § 2, 3 CFR at 128.
0 See Exec Order No 12866 § 1(a), (b)(6), 3 CFR 638, 638-39 (1993).
21 For a description of these provisions, see Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 22-24 (1995).
' See generally Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-74 (cited in note 4).
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1:10,000, such a worker will demand a wage premium of $500 to
incur the risk. A group of ten thousand such workers, one of
whom is expected to die, consequently will receive $5 million in
return for this additional risk. This kind of value-of-life calcula-
tion goes well beyond the monetary loss associated with the risk
of mortality and is generally accepted in the economics literature
as the appropriate measure of society's willingness to pay for risk
reduction.33 Moreover, this methodology has been explicitly en-
dorsed by the OMB for purposes of valuing risk reduction in reg-
ulatory policies.34 A value-of-life figure of $5 million falls in the
midpoint of the estimated range; most studies in the literature
have estimated the value of life anywhere from $3 million to $7
million.3"
For concreteness, let us take as an appropriate cutoff for reg-
ulatory policy the cost per statistical life saved of $5 million. Reg-
ulatory policies that save statistical lives are those addressed at
preventing very small risks of death. For example, a worker safe-
ty program that reduced job risks by 1/10,000 for 10,000 workers
would save one statistical life on average. The attractiveness of
these efforts is quite different from those that save identified
lives, such as the child trapped in a well or workers trapped in a
coal mine. If the OMB succeeded in approving only those policies
whose benefits exceeded the costs, then no policies with a cost
per life saved in excess of $5 million would be adopted. As the
statistics presented in Table 1 demonstrate, policies that meet
this benefit-cost threshold are the exception rather than the
norm. Indeed, very few policies actually pass the test. It is note-
worthy that all of the listed regulations from the Department of
Transportation ("DOT"), which is unusual in that it uses a bene-
fit-cost approach, do meet the benefit-cost test. In particular,
DOT traditionally valued lives at the present value of lost
earnings and did not pursue policies when the cost per life saved
exceeded that amount. Subsequently, DOT moved to a willing-
ness-to-pay approach and currently values life in the vicinity of
$3 million per statistical life."
For a survey of the literature, see id at 57-74.
See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States
Government, April 1, 1988-March 31, 1989 570 (US GPO 1989); Office of Management and
Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government, April 1, 1990-March 31,
1991 662-63 (US GPO 1990).
Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 51-74 (cited in note 4).
The author served as a consultant to the FAA and prepared a report to the agency
on value-of-life issues to facilitate the agency's recent selection of a value-of-life figure. See
1996] 1431
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Table 1: The Cost of Various Risk-Reducing
Regulations Per Life Saved
Pass Benefit-Cost Test
P, R, or F -- Proposed, rejected or final rule.
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risk to Life and Health, 31 J Econ Lit 1912 (1993) (study
based on FAA report).
Regulation Year & Agency
Status
Unvented Space Heaters 1980 F CPSC
Oil & Gas Well Service 1983 P OSHA-S
Cabin Fire Protection 1985 F FAA
Passive Restraints/Belts 1984 F NHTSA
Underground Construction 1989 F OSHA-S
Alcohol & Drug Control 1985 F FRA
Servicing Wheel Rims 1984 F OSHA-S
Seat Cushion Flammability 1984 F FAA
Floor Emergency Lighting 1984 F FAA
Crane Susp Persnl Platf 1988 F OSHA-S
Cncrte & Masonry Constr 1988 F OSHA-S
Hazard Communication 1983 F OSHA-S
Benzene/Fugtve Emissions 1984 F EPA
[63:14231432
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continued on next page
* Annual deaths per exposed population. An
of 103 is 1,000, 104 is 10,000, etc.
exposed population
Source: Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 264 table 14-5 (cited in note
4). Based on information presented in John F. Morrall III, A
Review of the Record, 10 Reg 25, 30 (Nov-Dec 1986). These statis-
tics were updated by John F. Morrall III, via unpublished com-
munication with the author, July 10, 1990.
Initial Annual Cost Per Life
Annual Risk7 Lives Saved Saved (millions
of 1984 dollars)
2.7 in 105 63.000 .10
1.1 in 103 50.000 .10
6.5 in 108 15.000 .20
9.1 in 105 1,850.000 .30
1.6 in 103 8.100 .30
1.8 in 106 4.200 .50
1.4 in 105 2.300 .50
1.6 in 107 37.000 .60
2.2 in 108 5.000 .70
1.8 in 103 5.000 1.20
1.4 in 105 6.500 1.40
4.0 in 105 200.000 1.80
2.1 in 105 0.310 2.80
1996] 1433
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Table 1 (continued)
Fail Benefit-Cost Test
Regulation Year & Agency
Status
Grain Dust 1987 F OSHA-S
Radionuclides/Urnm Mines 1984 F EPA
Benzene 1987 F OSHA-H
Arsenic/Glass Plant 1986 F EPA
Ethylene Oxide 1984 F OSHA-H
Arsenic/Copper Smelter 1986 F EPA
Urnium Mill Tlngs Inactive 1983 F EPA
Urnium Mill Tlngs Active 1983 F EPA
Asbestos 1986 F OSHA-H
Asbestos 1989 F EPA
Arsenic/Glass Mfrg 1986 R EPA
Benzene/Storage 1984 R EPA
Radionuclides/DOE Facits 1984 R EPA
Radionuclides/Elm Phsphrs 1984 R EPA
Benzene/Ethylbnznl Styrne 1984 R EPA
Arsenic/Low-Arsnc Copper 1986 R EPA
Benzene/Maleic Anhydride 1984 R EPA
Land Disposal 1988 F EPA
EDB 1989 R OSHA-H
Formaldehyde 1987 F OSHA-H
[63:14231434
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Initial Annual Cost Per Life
Annual Risk Lives Saved Saved (millions
of 1984 dollars)
2.1 in 104 4.000 5.30
1.4 in 104 1.100 6.90
8.8 in 104 3.800 17.10
8.0 in 104 0.110 19.20
4.4 in 105 2.800 25.60
9.0 in 104 0.060 26.50
4.3 in 104 2.100 27.60
4.3 in 104 2.100 53.00
6.7 in 105 74.700 89.30
2.9 in 105 10.000 104.20
3.8 in 105 0.250 142.00
6.0 in 107 0.043 202.00
4.3 in 106 0.001 210.00
1.4 in 105 0.046 270.00
2.0 in 106 0.006 483.00
2.6 in 104 0.090 764.00
1.1 in 106 0.029 820.00
2.3 in 108 2.520 3,500.00
2.5 in 104 0.002 15,600.00
6.8 in 107 0.010 72,000.00
1996] 1435
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The costs of most of the regulations in Table 1 exceed the $5
million-per-lost-life threshold. It should be emphasized that Table
1 includes only specific regulatory policies and does not include
agency actions and programs that do not result in actual regula-
tions. For example, the Superfund program prevents cases of
cancer at a cost per case avoided of almost $4 billion, but this
program is not captured in the statistics reported here.3 ' Table 1
includes both proposed and rejected regulations. If in fact the
regulatory oversight process eliminated all regulations that did
not pass a benefit-cost test, then, assuming that there were no
other major categories of unquantified benefits, one would expect
all regulations with a cost per life saved in excess of $5 million to
be rejected. However, it is noteworthy that the agencies have not
rejected all such ineffective programs. Indeed, the lowest cost-
per-life-saved amount for a regulation rejected by the OMB is the
one associated with the EPA's arsenic/glass manufacturing stan-
dard, for which the cost per life saved was $142 million. Thus,
the OMB has succeeded in eliminating only extremely ineffective
regulations. This result has not arisen because the OMB failed to
implement the terms of the Executive Orders. Rather, it is a con-
sequence of the strict nature of agencies' legislative mandates,
which require or permit them to foster narrowly defined objec-
tives, such as risk reduction or environmental protection, irre-
spective of maintaining a reasonable benefit-cost tradeoff.
IV. ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY POLICY TESTS
A. Benefit-Cost Analysis
The most comprehensive regulatory test from an economic
efficiency standpoint is benefit-cost analysis.3 ' The overall con-
cept is straightforward and quite intuitively appealing. In partic-
ular, government agencies should adopt regulatory policies that
best advance society's interests, or those that provide the great-
est amount of benefits, less costs. In addition, no regulatory poli-
cy should be pursued unless the benefits exceed the costs. In the
case of a regulation targeted at mortality risks, the expected
'3 The Superfund cost estimate of $4 billion per case of cancer is discussed in W. Kip
Viscusi and James T. Hamilton, Cleaning up Superfund, Pub Int 52 (Summer 1996). This
research was prepared under a cooperative agreement with the EPA.
' See generally Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis
(Norton 1978).
1436 [63:1423
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1436 1996
Regulating the Regulators
number of lives saved multiplied by the value of life must exceed
the regulatory costs for the policy to be desirable on this view.
Much of the controversy over this test arises from the fre-
quent concern that not all benefit components are adequately
considered. This difficulty is particularly great with respect to
policy outcomes that lack both readily available market prices
and market-based techniques to infer such prices. For example,
attaching a dollar value to scarce natural resources or endan-
gered species is not a straightforward process.
The practical alternative to market-based pricing is a contin-
gent valuation approach in which respondents to survey ques-
tions assume hypothetical markets for these commodities and
indicate their willingness to pay for the commodities' preserva-
tion.39 As the debate over the Exxon Valdez oil spill valuation
indicated, there is no clear-cut basis for establishing these values
in a noncontroversial manner.0
Even when what is at stake is individuals' lives, regulatory
policy debates are subject to a variety of uncertainties. To assess
the statistical lives lost from a given danger, one must assess the
risk probability as well as the total population exposed. More-
over, one must attach a value to the lives at stake. All three of
these enterprises are, to say the least, tricky. The scientific evi-
dence pertaining to risk-probability values is often hotly debat-
ed.41 As a result, government agencies frequently assess the
magnitude of the risk in broad terms, reflecting the conflicting
scientific evidence. That is, agencies have responded to this un-
certainty by using "conservative" risk assessments that focus on
upper-bound values, a controversial step that will be considered
in greater detail below.
42
The second component of the risk assessment is the magni-
tudes of the populations exposed. In the case of risk assessment
for Suparfand sites, the EPA considers not only current popula-
tions but also potential future populations in currently unpopu-
lated areas.' Hypothetical future populations should not receive
' See generally W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contin-
gent Valuation, 8 J Econ Persp 19 (Fall 1994).
40 The main debate was over whether public opinion surveys could yield reliable
estimates of the value of nonuse environmental damages. The plaintiffs had confidence in
these techniques, whereas Exxon challenged their validity. See generally id.
4 See generally Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, eds,
Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (MIT 1993).
42 Albert L. Nichols and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Con-
servative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, 10 Reg 13 (Nov-Dec 1986) (describing the
distortions in regulatory policy caused by the use of "conservative" risk assessments).
' See James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for
1996] 1437
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1437 1996
1438 The University of Chicago Law Review [63:1423
the same weight as current populations actually exposed to the
risk since there may never be such residents exposed to toxic
hazards. Ideally, one should weigh future exposed groups by the
probability that such groups will in fact exist to be exposed.
Moreover, other policy actions, such as the imposition of deed
restrictions and the capping and fencing of hazardous waste
sites, might prevent these hypothetical exposures.
Surprisingly, the third aspect of risk assessment-valuing
the lives that will be lost-may be the most precisely estimated
component of the regulatory analysis.4 Difficulties arise, howev-
er, in making judgments regarding people whose durations of
future lifetime differ. For example, should society be willing to
spend more to save the life of a twenty-three-year-old than some-
one who is ninety-five? This problem is simplified to some extent
when one realizes that regulatory policies do not confer immor-
tality but rather simply extend lifetimes.45 Adjusting for the
quality and quantity of lives saved is, however, a degree of refine-
ment that no doubt will continue to be problematic. However,
given the failure of policymakers even to incorporate first princi-
ples of efficient targeting, as exemplified by the regulatory expen-
diture levels in Table 1, nuances such as distinguishing among
populations in valuing life need not be resolved at the outset.
A typical assumption in benefit-cost analysis is that the
agencies' assessment of benefits is most uncertain, whereas the
costs are fixed. However, closer examination reveals that even
the cost components are quite uncertain. For example, Superfund
cleanup costs have considerably exceeded EPA's original esti-
mates,' and in the case of the controversial cotton dust regula-
tion, OSHA greatly misestimated both the costs and benefits of
the regulation.'
What then should policymakers do when benefits and costs
are highly uncertain? One possibility is to do nothing at all until
further information clarifies these values. Deferring decisions is
sometimes an appropriate strategy, particularly when informa-
Superfund, 21 Ecol L Q 573, 586-88 (1994).
See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 34-74 (cited in note 4).
See generally Richard Zeckhauser and Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving
Lives?, 40 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Autumn 1976).
" See generally Milton Russell, E. William Colglazier, and Mary R. English, Hazard-
ous Waste Remediation: The Task Ahead (Tennessee 1991).
"" See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 161-77 (cited in note 4); see generally Paul W. Kolp
and W. Kip Viscusi, Uncertainty in Risk Analysis: A Retrospective Assessment of the OSHA
Cotton Dust Standard, 4 Advances in Applied Microeconomics 105 (1986).
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tion is likely forthcoming and when correcting an erroneous regu-
latory decision is expensive. However, inaction may also have
major costs of its own. If government agencies were to wait until
all scientific uncertainties were fully resolved, they would seldom
undertake any initiatives. The extent of the risks associated with
health hazards, such as the risks posed by airborne carcinogens,
remains a matter of debate. Should these be ignored? Safety
hazards, such as the risk of an automobile accident, are known
with much greater precision. However, even for accident risks,
particular information crucial to regulatory policy may not be
known. What, for example, will be the safety benefit of installing
side air bags in cars? Scientists are unlikely to be able to esti-
mate these mortality reductions with precision, as was shown by
their highly inaccurate predictions regarding the effect of seat
belts on auto safety."
In general, a lack of information should not cause policy
paralysis. We make decisions daily involving substantial uncer-
tainties, and the government should do likewise.4 9 By a similar
token, the existence of uncertainties is not a rationale for ignor-
ing the known benefit and cost consequences of policy.
Policymakers should not, in effect, abandon rational thought
about policy impacts and rely on their instincts simply because
they have encountered complexities and uncertainties. Indeed,
one might well argue that policy analysis is particularly useful
when the ramifications of the policy are sufficiently complicated
that the policy choice is not obvious.5"
B. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
A weaker variant of benefit-cost analysis is cost-effectiveness
analysis. Under this approach the agency must show that it has
adopted the cheapest way of achieving a specific objective, such
as a pollution reduction. Under benefit-cost analysis the agency
must do more. It must also show that achieving the specified
For a review of these policy assessments and their divergence from actual accident-
rate patterns, see Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J Pol
Econ 677 (1975).
" Indeed, in many cases one could argue that the government should be bolder than
we are as individuals, since at least in terms of cost uncertainties it can often spread
these uncertainties across the entire United States population.
' The importance of dealing with uncertainty from the standpoint of government
policy and using policy analysis are major themes in the principal textbook in the field.
See Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis (cited in note 38).
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objective makes sense, that is, the benefits of doing so exceed the
costs.
Cost-effectiveness analysis takes as given that the policy
objective is worthwhile. Such an assumption may not be warrant-
ed if, for all policy options, the costs of meeting that objective
exceed the benefits, or if there are other possible policy objectives
that are preferable. An agency may select the cheapest method
for reducing benzene emissions to a particular level, but the level
chosen may be excessively stringent. Until we have some
mechanism for ascertaining the wisdom of the underlying policy
objective, then mere cost-effectiveness is not a sufficient test of
policy adequacy.
Nevertheless, promoting cost-effective achievement of policy
objectives remains a salient policy concern. Policymakers have
employed cost-effectiveness as a guide in developing performance-
oriented standards. Traditionally, government regulatory agen-
cies such as EPA and OSHA have promulgated technology-forcing
standards that specify particular means of compliance that must
be adopted by the firm. The disadvantage of the technology-forc-
ing approach is that it eliminates the firm's discretion to choose
the least-cost mechanism of compliance. By specifying a perfor-
mance objective and giving firms leeway to select the means to
achieve this objective (instead of specifying a particular means of
compliance), agencies can enable firms to reduce their costs.
Two examples illustrate this phenomenon. First, the OSHA
grain dust standard gave firms several specific options for clean-
ing up grain dust levels in grain elevators to prevent risks of
explosion.5' If sweeping up the grain dust whenever it exceeded
one-eighth of an inch were cheaper than using pneumatic dust-
control equipment, then firms could reduce their compliance costs
by choosing the sweeping route. It is noteworthy, however, that
despite this flexibility, the grain dust standard still fails (albeit
barely) a benefit-cost test." Perhaps the greatest success story
for a performance-oriented standard is the EPA bubble policy.
Rather than requiring that each smokestack at a firm meet a
particular emission level, the EPA permitted firms to operate as
if surrounded by an artificial bubble.53 The question then be-
"' For a description of this regulation, see Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 275 (cited in
note 4).
See Table 1.
For a description of the EPA bubble policy, see Robert W. Crandall, Controlling In-
dustrial Pollution: The Economics and Politics of Clean Air 83-84 (Brookings 1983).
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came whether the total emissions from the plant were excessive,
thus permitting the firm to choose which emission sources to
reduce. This flexibility enabled firms to adopt the most cost-effec-
tive mechanism for pollution reduction, leading to over $400
million in cost savings.5' The more recent extensions of flexible
policy options such as the bubble policy and tradeable permits
increase this discretion by enabling firms to effectively bid for
pollution rights, producing annual savings of compliance costs
estimated at approximately $1 billion."
C. Risk Assessment
Rather than become embroiled in economic controversies
such as the appropriate amount to spend on risk reduction, why
not simply focus on risks alone? As indicated earlier, society
lacks the resources to eliminate all risks. Nevertheless, it is fea-
sible to prioritize policies based on risk by focusing our regulato-
ry energies first on the riskiest areas and then turning to less
risky activities.
In thinking about this approach, it is important to reiterate
what we mean by a risk level. Risk is the product of both the
probability and the severity of harm as well as the number of
people exposed. Unfortunately, in many instances, government
agencies simply focus on the probability and overlook the risk
exposure. In the case of the Superfund program, there are two
critical risk triggers.56 For Superfund sites with chemical risk
pathways that pose a cancer risk exceeding 10-4,"7 EPA regula-
tions suggest that cleanup is warranted. For risk levels smaller
than 10-6, cleanup is not warranted, and for risk levels in the
intermediate range between 10-4 and 10-6, cleanup is the subject
of a discretionary decision by EPA officials.58
What is noteworthy about this precision with respect to risks
is the total absence of population considerations. EPA assesses
' The cost savings from the EPA bubble policy are documented in Robert W. Hahn
and Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions
Trading Program, 6 Yale J Reg 109, 138 (1989).
' See Alan Carlin, The United States Experience with Economic Incentives to Control
Environmental Pollution 5-6, 5-12 to 5-13 (US EPA 1992).
See Hamilton and Viscusi, 21 Ecol L Q at 578-81 (cited in note 43).
5 Risk levels are expressed as the likelihood of one person developing cancer over a
lifetime. A risk level of "104' would predict one additional cancer case per ten thousand
exposed individuals; "10-6" would predict one additional case per one million exposed indi-
viduals.
Hamilton and Viscusi, 21 Ecol L Q at 578-81 (cited in note 43).
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risk levels to current populations now and in the future (desig-
nated current risk pathways), as well as risk levels to hypotheti-
cal future populations resulting from a change in land use, such
as vacant land becoming residential (designated future risk path-
ways). Real and potential risks are treated symmetrically, and in
each case the size of the population exposed to the risk does not
enter the calculations.
Even if population exposures were considered, risk alone is
not a sufficient guide. Consider the risk information in Table 2.
Table 2: Risks That Increase the Annual Death Risk
by One in One Million
Activity
Smoking 1.4 cigarettes
Drinking 0.5 liter of wine
Spending I hour in a
coal mine
Spending 3 hours in a
coal mine
Living 2 days in New York
or Boston
Traveling 6 minutes by canoe
Traveling 10 minutes by
bicycle
Traveling 150 miles by car
Flying 1000 miles by jet
Flying 6000 miles by jet
Living 2 months in Denver
Living 2 months in average
stone or brick building












Cancer caused by cosmic
radiation
Cancer caused by cosmic
radiation
Cancer caused by natural
radioactivity
Cancer caused by radiation
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Living 2 months with a
cigarette smoker
Eating 40 tablespoons of
peanut butter
Drinking Miami drinking
water for 1 year
Drinking 30 12-oz. cans of
diet soda
Living 5 years at site
boundary of nuclear power
plant in the open
Drinking 1000 24-oz. soft
drinks from banned plastic
bottles
Living 20 years near PVC
plant
Living 150 years within 20
miles of nuclear power plant
Eating 100 charcoal-broiled
steaks
Risk of accident by living
within 5 miles of nuclear
reactor for 50 years
Cancer, heart disease
Liver cancer caused by
aflatoxin B
Cancer caused by chloroform
Cancer caused by saccharin
Cancer caused by radiation
Cancer from acrylonitrile
monomer
Cancer caused by vinyl
chloride (1976 standard)
Cancer caused by radiation
Cancer from benzopyrene
Cancer caused by radiation
Source: Richard Wilson, Analyzing the Daily Risks of
Life, 81 Tech Rev 41, 45 table (1979).
A risk of death of one in a million arises every time we spend one
hour in a coal mine (black lung disease), spend two days in Bos-
ton (air pollution), travel six minutes by canoe, eat forty table-
spoons of peanut butter, or drink Miami drinking water for one
year. Which risk is most deserving of regulation? Should we
target environmental exposures and give them higher priority
than recreational risks?
One approach might be to look at total body counts rather
than risk probabilities. If our concern is with accidental deaths,
then the leading candidate for regulation would be automobiles,
as motor vehicles now account for roughly forty-two thousand of
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the ninety thousand accidental deaths per year.59 However, we
have already expended considerable resources for a variety of
automobile safety devices, so our willingness to redesign automo-
biles to improve safety or our willingness to abandon automobiles
altogether is likely to be quite limited.
If instead we wish to focus on all causes of death in the Unit-
ed States, the three leading candidates would be personal con-
sumption decisions-tobacco, dietlactivity patterns, and alcohol.
Together, these activities contribute to 38 percent of all
deaths. 0 Yet, are we willing to abandon smoking and drinking
and undertake a vigorous exercise program to reduce these risks
substantially? Or, alternatively, would we prefer the government
to target toxic agents? Toxic agents are estimated to account for
only 3 percent of all deaths-less than one-tenth of the amount
caused by the three leading risky consumption activities.6"
In his recent book, Justice Stephen Breyer advocates using a
variety of reference points, such as the risk level posed by ciga-
rettes or automobiles, to help policymakers think more sensibly
about risk. 2 However, his most compelling comparisons empha-
size costs. He observes that expenditure levels for asbestos re-
moval would only be consistent with our other private expendi-
tures on safety if we were willing to spend much more than we
now do for automobile safety:
We can translate the [asbestos removal] figure into a more
intuitively accessible number by recalling that auto acci-
dents kill about fifty thousand people each year. We might
then imagine how much we would willingly pay for a slightly
safer car, a car that would reduce auto deaths by, say, 5
percent, to 47,500. Would we pay an extra $1,000 for such a
car? An extra $5,000 for that added contribution to safety?
To spend $100 billion as a nation to save ten lives annually
assumes we value safety so much that each of us would pay
$48,077 extra for any such new, slightly safer car.63
Ultimately, some comparison of risks and costs is necessary
to assess whether the beneficial aspects of the regulatory policy
See National Safety Council, Accident Facts, 1994 Edition 1 (1994).
0 See J. Michael McGinnis and William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the
United States, 270 JAMA 2207, 2207-08 (1993).
81 Id at 2208-09.
e' See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
3-10 (Harvard 1993).
6 Id at 13-14.
1444 [63:1423
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1444 1996
Regulating the Regulators
warrant the cost. Making such comparisons is not necessarily
detrimental to regulatory policy. The FAA decided not to require
wing modifications for the DC-10 because the risk reduction
achieved would decrease the risk of a plane crash by only one
chance in a billion. However, the cost of the modification-two
thousand dollars-was small enough that on a benefit-cost basis
over the life of the plane it would have been worthwhile to re-
quire the necessary changes."
Risk levels alone are not a sufficient guide to policy. Proba-
bilities of the hazard and numbers of people exposed to the risk
are surely consequential. However, our unwillingness to forego
all risky personal consumption activities, whether it be slothful-
ness or eating red meat, and our similar unwillingness to invest
in risk-free but very fuel-inefficient cars that might resemble
tanks, suggests that ultimately we do wish to select the risks we
face in a manner that recognizes tradeoffs.
The magnitude of a risk is, however, potentially instructive,
particularly as an input to benefits analysis-provided that the
risk is properly assessed. Unfortunately, current risk assessment
practices throughout the federal government typically do not
yield unbiased risk judgments. Rather, current practices empha-
size upper bounds of the possible risk values, or what has been
designated a "conservatism" bias.6" In the case of the EPA
Superfund program, there is a focus on upper bounds of the po-
tential risk. EPA analysts often use parameter estimates from
the ninety-fifth percentile of the parameter distribution. Thus,
the emphasis in each stage of the calculations is on how bad the
risk could be under a worst-case scenario that might occur 5 per-
cent of the time rather than on the expected consequences.66 If,
however, one uses the ninety-fifth percentile for each component
of a calculation and then compounds these risk-parameter esti-
mates when calculating the total risk, the degree of conservatism
will be much greater. EPA calculations of groundwater ingestion
risks, for example, use upper-bound values for ingestion rate,
exposure frequency, exposure duration, chemical concentration,
and toxicity. The net effect of compounding these upper-bound
' See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace
112-13 (Harvard 1983).
' For a more detailed discussion of this bias, see generally Nichols and Zeckhauser,
10 Reg at 13 (cited in note 42).
" W. Kip Viscusi, James T. Hamilton, and P. Christen Dockins, Policy Consequences
of Conservative Risk Assessments for Hazardous Waste Sites, Duke University Working
Paper (on ifie with U Chi L Rev).
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values for five different parameter estimates is that the overall
degree of conservatism for the total risk assessed at Superfund
sites is beyond the ninety-ninth percentile of the risk distribu-
tion.
Consider how these biases could become compounded within
the context of a simple example. Suppose that EPA assumes that
the concentration of hazardous chemicals at a site is at the upper
bound of what it could possibly be so that there is only one
chance in twenty that the chemicals could be this risky. Also
assume that we make worst-case scenario assumptions regarding
the total amount of the hazardous chemicals that will be ingested
through ground water contamination, where this ingestion will
also occur with a probability of 1 in 20. Then the probability that
we will have a worst-case scenario in terms of the concentration
of the chemical as well as the amount of the chemical that is
ingested will be 1 in 400, or the product of these two 1 in 20
probabilities if the events are independent. By focusing on the
worst-case scenario for every parameter that is used to assess the
risk, EPA is in effect assuming that everything that could possi-
bly go wrong will go wrong simultaneously, which is much more
unlikely than any one thing going wrong individually.
Focusing on upper-bound values creates a variety of distor-
tions. First, the exact extent of the conservatism is generally not
known to policymakers. The degree of conservatism varies by
parameter and across policy-decision contexts, making compara-
tive judgments difficult. We know that the risk assessments are
"conservative," but not how conservative or whether the degree of
conservatism is the same in every instance. Second, focusing on
conservative risk parameters creates a bias in favor of regulating
uncertain risks. Consider two different chemical hazards. Chem-
ical A poses a known risk of cancer of 2 in 100,000. Chemical B
has uncertain properties. Scientists have differing opinions over
the relative risk of the two chemicals, as nine scientists out of
ten believe that chemical B is without risk and one out of ten
believes that the risk may be as high as 6 in 100,000. Adopting
the conservative approach, government officials would focus on
chemical B since it poses the greatest potential risk. However, we
would save a greater expected number of lives if we focused on
chemical A, for which the mean predicted risk is greater.67
For a defense of using conservative risk values, see James E. Krier, Risk and
Design, 19 J Legal Stud 781 (1990).
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The third, more general problem with a conservatism bias is
that it institutionalizes an irrational form of economic behavior.
A well known form of irrationality in economics is the Ellsberg
paradox.68 Suppose that you win a prize if you draw a red ball
from urn 1, which contains 50 red balls and 50 white balls. Sim-
ilarly, suppose that you win an identical prize if you can draw a
ball of the color you named from urn 2, which contains an un-
specified mixture of 100 red and white balls. Which urn do you
prefer? Respondents generally prefer the urn offering the known
probability of success even though the risk probabilities are
equivalent.69 Similarly, when faced with the prospect of losses,
individuals would rather face a known probability of incurring a
loss rather than an imprecise probability.7 ° These various forms
of ambiguity aversion comprise a well known class of anomalies
in economics that contradicts usual models of expected utility
theory."' The government should not mimic these shortcomings
in individual behavior, but rather it should make the kinds of
rational and balanced decisions that people would make if they
could understand risk sensibly. Paying excessive attention to the
worst possible outcome while ignoring much more probable risk
levels distorts policy-making and diverts our risk reduction re-
sources from truly substantial hazards to minuscule risks that
are not well understood.
Some of the impetus for conservative risk assessment may
stem from past unfavorable experiences with risks that were
underestimated. In the case of the space shuttle program, NASA
authorities estimated the risk of a disaster before the Challenger
explosion as 1 flight in 100,000.72 In 1988, the agency had raised
the estimated risk of a catastrophe over the entire mission to 1 in
50. Recent safety investments have led to a midpoint risk esti-
mate of 1 in 145, with the risk range extending from 1 in 76 to 1
in 230 missions.
' For a description of this paradox as well as the counterpart of ambiguity aversion
in the case of losses, see Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 135-36, 143-45 (cited in note 4).
' One can, for example, turn the "soft" probability of urn 2 into a "hard" probability
by flipping a fair coin and then selecting the ball color based on the outcome.
70 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 143-45 (cited in note 4).
7 For a review of this literature, see Colin Camerer and Martin Weber, Recent Devel-
opments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty 325
(1992).
' These statistics as well as the subsequent statistics in this paragraph are drawn
from William J. Broad, Risks Remain Despite NASA's Rebuilding, NY Times 1, 12 (Jan
28, 1996).
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The main message from this experience is not that we should
undertake risk assessments as if Murphy's Law (if anything can
go wrong it will) operates. Rather, the experience should high-
light the dangers that may arise from excessive optimism, partic-
ularly when overly optimistic assumptions are compounded. In
responding to this experience, however, we should not necessarily
adopt the opposite approach of compounding overly pessimistic
assumptions. The proper task for risk assessors is to use the best
information currently available to assess the true range of the
risk, and then to determine which risk level is the most reliable
mean estimate of the actual risk. If our risk assessments are
truly unbiased, then we should expect an equal number of
overestimations and underestimations. Thus, there is no danger
of systematic underestimation.
D. Risk-Risk Analysis
A single-minded commitment to risk reduction is not only an
overly narrow approach to evaluating a regulatory policy, but it
is also potentially harmful even from the standpoint of reducing
risk. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, overzealous policies can
actually increase societal risk rather than decrease it.
This observation formed the basis of a judicial commentary
on an expensive OSHA regulation in which Judge Williams of the
D.C. Circuit observed that excessive regulatory expenditures
would make society poorer, potentially worsening individual
health.73 Perhaps inspired by this opinion, the OMB raised with
agencies the issue of the potentially counterproductive effects of
excessive regulatory expenditures.74 This Section will explore
the different variants of what has come to be known as risk-risk
analysis, 5 indicating how even if risk reduction is the only ob-
jective of a regulatory policy, we must do more than focus on the
direct risk effects of the policy alone.
See International Union, UAW v OSHA, 938 F2d 1310, 1326-27 (DC Cir 1991)
(Williams concurring).
' The opening salvo in this administrative battle was a March 10, 1992, letter from
James B. MacRae, Jr., Acting Administrator of OIRA, to Nancy Risque-Rohrbach, Assis-
tant Secretary for Policy, United States Department of Labor. For a discussion of this
letter and the ensuing controversy, see Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the
Costs ofRegulations, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 96, 96-97 (1994).
" See generally Lester B. Lave, The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frame-
works for Policy (Brookings 1981); John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds, Risk
versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard 1995).
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The first form of risk-risk tradeoff to appear in the economics
literature pertains to risk offsets associated with regulatory poli-
cies, or what recent proposed legislation refers to as "substitution
risks."7" Regulations that ban activities or products almost in-
variably create substitution risks. This occurs when the commodi-
ties that replace those that are banned carry their own risks, so
that the net risk change is not as great as it might seem initially.
If, for example, we require that infants riding in airplanes not sit
in their parents' laps but rather have their own seat and safety
belt, then the cost of an additional ticket will lead some parents
to drive, which is a riskier mode of travel. Similarly, eliminating
pesticides from our diet by eating organic produce will reduce the
risk of cancer from pesticides, but if the result is that we eat
fewer fruits and vegetables, our overall cancer risk may in-
crease.77 To prevent the risk of fire-related burns, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") required that children's
sleepwear be coated with the flame retardant Tris, but later dis-
covered that this chemical was potentially carcinogenic.78 This
risk-risk tradeoff is a type of substitution risk.
The class of risk-offset effects that has particularly captured
the attention of economists involves product users' diminished
safety precautions in response to regulatory protections. If the
government regulates products or activities in a way that makes
them less dangerous, then users will have diminished incentives
to take care. Initial research on the safety effects resulting from
seat belt use suggested that the use of these belts may have led
drivers to go faster, thus partially offsetting some of the safety
gains.79 Debate over the magnitude of this phenomenon contin-
ues, as researchers remain uncertain as to whether the dimin-
ished care is sufficient to offset the beneficial effect of seat belts.
Nevertheless, broad evidence indicates at least some diminished
precaution taking, as reflected in the increased risk to pedestri-
7' HR 1022 contains a particularly extensive treatment of substitution risk, requiring
that agencies recognize this phenomenon and incorporate analyses of substitution risks in
their assessments of regulatory policies. See Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of
1995, HR 1022 § 105(4), 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 23, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H2261,
H2263 (Feb 27, 1995).
' For a discussion of this tradeoff, see Bruce N. Ames and Lois Swirsky Gold, Envi-
ronmental Pollution and Cancer: Some Misconceptions, in Kenneth R. Foster, David E.
Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, eds, Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law 153,
176-78 (MIT 1993).
' See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety 111 (American Enterprise
Institute 1984).
' See Peltzman, 83 J Pol Econ at 703-05 (cited in note 48).
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ans and motorcyclists in the aftermath of the seat belt regula-
tions.8"
Although people might quite rationally choose to take fewer
precautions after safety technologies have reduced the risks,
diminished care also may result from the public's overassessment
of the adequacy of these safety efforts. One possibility, which I
have termed the "lulling effect," is that consumers may be lulled
into a false sense of security and diminish their care by too great
an extent."' CPSC officials frequently refer to child-resistant
caps as being child-proof. But the introduction of these caps did
not result in the expected diminishing in poisonings. Because of
the difficulty of grappling with the caps, many parents left the
caps off the bottles; indeed, almost 50 percent of poisonings re-
sulted from open bottles." In addition, some parents may per-
mit children greater access to the products because of an appar-
ent belief that the products are safer, a phenomenon consistent
with the observed failure of safety caps to decrease poisoning
rates below the level expected in the absence of the regulation.
The "lulling effect" is visible in parental behavior following
the recent regulation mandating child-resistant cigarette light-
ers." Parents report that the child-resistant mechanism gives
them greater peace of mind and decreases their safety concerns.
There is also evidence, based on actual placements of lighters in
households, that the introduction of the child-resistant mecha-
nism has led parents to leave lighters in locations more accessi-
ble to children. In this instance, the net prediction is that on
balance the child-resistant mechanism will enhance safety since
the safety benefits of the lighter feature outweigh the conse-
quences of the diminished care. Nevertheless, there is clear-cut
evidence that the diminished precaution taking will decrease the
extent of the risk improvement that would otherwise occur.
These responses highlight the importance of alerting consumers
and workers to the continued need for precautionary behavior
even in the presence of safety regulations.
' See Glenn C. Blomquist, The Regulation of Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety 55-74
(Kluwer 1988).
" For discussion of this phenomenon, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The
Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 Am Econ
Rev 324 (May 1984); Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 224-27 (cited in note 4).
In particular, the open-bottle share of poisonings in 1978, the last year for which
data are available, was 49 percent for aspirin and 47 percent for aspirin and analgesics.
See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs at 238 (cited in note 4).
' See W. Kip Viscusi and Gerald 0. Cavallo, The Effect of Product Safety Regulation
on Safety Precautions, 14 Risk Analysis 917 (1994).
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A second type of risk-risk tradeoff is an inevitable conse-
quence of all economic activity. Quite simply, all economic activi-
ty is risky. Workers are injured daily in construction, manufac-
turing, and even in white-collar work. Regulatory requirements
trigger a variety of economic activities, whether it be producing
scrubbers for the reduction of air pollution, removing asbestos
from schools, or driving a car back to the dealer after an automo-
bile recall. Injuries and deaths resulting from these activities are
inevitable. If we place a dollar value of $50,000 on each statisti-
cal injury and $5 million on each statistical fatality, then 3 to 4
percent of all industry expenditures comprise the costs associated
with worker injuries." If our only concern is with risk, we
should surely be cognizant of the fact that regulatory expendi-
tures will generate economic activity, which itself will be risky. If
the regulations are extremely ineffective, then these expenditure-
related risks alone would render the regulatory effort counterpro-
ductive.
For concreteness, suppose that a regulation saves one statis-
tical life through its direct effect on safety. At what expenditure
level will the regulation generate economic activity that will lead
to more health risks than the regulation prevents? Suppose that
the safety improvement resulting from the regulation is valued at
$5 million. Then the health risk arising from regulatory expendi-
tures will just equal this amount if the cost per statistical life
saved is $167 million (if injuries comprise 3 percent of regulatory
costs) or $125 million (if injuries comprise 4 percent of regulatory
costs).
Applying this approach to the regulatory cost levels in Table
1, the expenditure-related health costs of regulation imply that
all regulations at or below the arsenic/glass manufacturing stan-
dard will be counterproductive at the lower end of this cost
range, and all regulations below the benzene storage regulations
will be counterproductive at the upper end.
" These estimates are derived by W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The
Fatality and Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J Risk & Uncertainty 19 (1994). That article
also presents industry-specific estimates of both the injury costs and the fatality costs of
regulatory expenditures. In many respects these estimates are simply the flip side of the
estimates of compensating differentials that workers receive for incurring risks. The fact
that workers are compensated for many of these risks may affect how society views them
from a benefit-cost standpoint. To the extent that markets provide for compensation of
these risks, the rationale for regulation will not be good. However, if our only concern is
with health effects, to be consistent agencies should consider all health effects of policies,
both good and bad.
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The third form of risk-risk analysis was the focus of Judge
Williams's concurrence and has been the focus of efforts by the
OMB. The underlying idea is that regulatory expenditures repre-
sent opportunity costs to society that divert resources from other
uses. These funds could have provided for greater health care,
food, housing, and other goods and services that promote individ-
ual longevity. The economics behind this relationship is not con-
troversial." Being richer is safer than being poorer.
Estimating the magnitude of the tradeoff is more difficult.
Table 3 summarizes a recent set of studies that have identified
this linkage.







Study Nature of Relationship dollars)
Hadley and 1 percent increase in total 33.2
Osei (1982) family income for white
males age 45-64 leads to .07
percent decline in mortality.
U.S. Joint 3 percent drop in real per 3.0
Economic capita income in 1973 reces-
Committee sion generated 2.3 percent
(1984) increase in mortality.
Anderson Longitudinal survey, Social 1.9
and Security Administration
Burkhauser Retirement History Survey,
(1985) 1969-79. $1 difference in
hourly wage levels in 1969
generates 4.2 percent differ-
ence in mortality rates over
next 10 years.
For derivation of these relationships, see W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality effects of regu-
latory costs and policy evaluation criteria, 25 RAND J Econ 94 (1994).
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Duleep Social Security mortality 2.7
(1986) data 1973-78 for men aged
36-65 imply a higher mortali-
ty rate of .023 for income
group $3,000-$6,000 com-
pared to income group
$6,000-$9,000.
Keeney Mortality rate-income level 12.5
(1990), based data fit expositional curve
on Kitagawa relating mortality rates to
and Hauser income, employing 1959 data
(1973) on mortality of whites, age
25-64, death certificate infor-
mation.
Lutter and International data on mortal- 9.3
Morrall ity-income relationship from
(1994) the World Bank, 1965 and
1986.
Chapman Social Security Administra- 13.3
and tion Retirement History
Hariharan Survey, 1969-1979, control-
(1994) ling for initial health status;
tradeoff of $12.2 million per
life in 1969 dollars.
For the most part, researchers have used regression analyses to
assess the role of individual and family income on mortality.
Some of these studies focus on specific events that led to decreas-
es in income, such as recessions, whereas others utilize national
or international data over a longer period. The range reflected in
these estimates is quite broad; the income drop needed to gener-
ate one expected death has been placed at anywhere between
$1.9 million and $33.2 million.
Perhaps the greatest limitation of these studies is the corre-
lation between income and health. Higher income levels promote
healthy consumption patterns and individual longevity. On the
other hand, improved health enhances one's earning capabilities.
Disentangling this linkage may be particularly difficult, espe-
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cially given that income is correlated with other health-enhanc-
ing variables, such as knowledge of how to decrease health risks.
To eliminate these statistical controversies, I developed an
alternative approach that does not utilize direct estimates of the
mortality-income relationship.86 Instead, it exploits the theoreti-
cal linkage between the amount of money that people are willing
to spend to save a statistical life-approximately $5 million on
average-and the amount of expenditures that will lead to the
loss of a statistical life. Surely individuals would not be willing to
undertake expenditures that are counterproductive with respect
to risk. Thus, it is implausible that workers could reveal a value
of life of $5 million in their job safety decisions, while at the
same time society loses a statistical life every time $1.9 million
(the lowest estimate in Table 3) is spent. If that were the case,
firms investing $5 million per statistical life in improved safety
conditions would kill more than two workers in doing so because
spending $5 million on the usual mix of goods would save more
than two lives. Using the theoretical linkage between the value of
saving a statistical life and the regulatory expenditure that will
lead to the loss of a statistical life, I showed that this amount
will be approximately ten times the implicit value of saving a
statistical life, or $50 million." Thus, for every regulatory policy
in Table 1 below the uranium mill tailings-inactive standard, the
income loss-mortality linkage suggests that the regulation will
produce a net health loss.
There are consequently three risk-risk effects that cut across
regulatory policies and limit their effectiveness. The first effect,
substitution risk, varies from context to context and cannot be
assessed on any general level. However, an overall assessment of
the other two risk-risk effects is possible. The bad news for gov-
ernment regulators is that both of these risk-risk offsets are at
work. Suppose that the regulators are considering a $100 billion
regulatory program. Using a midpoint estimate that the direct
health costs of expenditures are 3.5 percent of the total expendi-
ture, there will be $3.5 billion in direct health losses. The second
adverse consequence-income loss-mortality effect-will be the
loss of two thousand statistical lives when the government
This approach was originally developed for the Executive Office of the President in
the Bush Administration. The 1992 Report by the author to OMB, Wealth, Health Invest-
ments, and the Value of Life, was refined in Viscusi, 25 RAND J Econ at 94 (cited in note
85).
8, See Viscusi, 25 RAND J Econ at 105-07 (cited in note 85).
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spends $100 billion. Using a value of $5 million to assess the
value of each life lost leads to a total cost of $10 billion. In all,
there will be $13.5 billion in health losses from $100 billion in
regulatory costs. Unless the regulation generates at least $13.5
billion in health benefits, individual health will be made worse
off by the regulation.
This result can be used to calculate the critical cost per life
threshold that must be met for a regulation to have beneficial ef-
fects on individual health. For any regulatory expenditure of $37
million or more per statistical life, there will be a net loss of life
and health due to the combined effect of the expenditure-health
linkage and the income loss-mortality linkage. In terms of Table
1, the counterproductive range of regulatory policies begins just
below the uranium mill tailings-inactive regulation.
A regulation that increases risk is not in society's interest.
Such a regulation is extremely counterproductive in that it does
not even meet the narrow test of enhancing society's health.
Surely regulatory agencies should be concerned with this broader
effect of regulatory policy since their mandate is to improve the
health and welfare of citizens generally, not simply within the
narrow confines of a particular regulatory policy. If a policy un-
duly harms individual health in ways not considered by the regu-
lators, it should not be pursued.
As a practical matter, much of the appeal of risk-risk analy-
sis stems from its ability to provide a quantitative test for regula-
tory policy in a world in which strict benefit-cost analysis is not
always feasible. Should this approach ever gain widespread ac-
ceptance within the government, it could potentially eliminate
some of the most counterproductive regulations. However, it is
not a substitute for a more comprehensive benefit-cost analysis




V. REGULATORY REFORM LEGISLATION
The 104th Congress has considered a variety of regulatory
reform bills in 1995 and 1996. These bills seek to restructure the
way in which government agencies approach regulations. In some
instances, the proposed legislation consists of omnibus bills ap-
The existence of the risk-risk relationship does, however, require that one modify
the traditional benefit-cost test. For a discussion of the necessary modifications, see gen-
erally Viscusi, 25 RAND J Econ at 94 (cited in note 85).
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plying to all regulatory agencies. 9 In other instances, the bills
are more narrowly focused and address only a single regulatory
area, such as Superfimd90 or energy risk management.9
The content of these bills is quite diffuse, as they include not
only numerous guidelines for policy analysis but many institu-
tional reforms as well. Three components, present in all the bills,
seem most critical to improving economic efficiency in regulatory
policy: inclusion of a supermandate, imposition of a benefit-cost
test requirement, and a stipulation that risk assessments be
honest and unbiased.
The supermandate assumption is perhaps most important.
The provisions of some of the bills (for example, S 343) would not
be binding on an agency if they were inconsistent with the
agency's existing legislative mandate. However, since most of the
risk and environmental regulatory agency legislation either ex-
pressly precludes a benefit-cost test or else gives the agency ad-
ministrator leeway to interpret the mission-oriented nature of its
mandate as if it did, there -may be a great many cases in which
the reform bill provisions simply will not be binding. The practi-
cal advantage of a sweeping reform bill is that it can impose a
broadly accepted criterion for policy assessment in all domains of
regulatory policy, eliminating the need to revise legislation on a
case-by-case basis, which is less politically feasible. The potential
disadvantage is that such legislation may not give special consid-
eration to particular problem areas that might arise; these areas,
however, can best be addressed within the substantive provisions
of the legislation discussed below.
The second provision common to all of the regulatory reform
legislation, and the most important of the substantive provisions,
is a benefit-cost requirement. In particular, the focal point of all
these bills is a stipulation that the agency demonstrate that the
benefits of the regulation exceed the costs. For this standard to
work in all policy contexts, however, it is necessary to include the
appropriate qualifier that not all benefit and cost components
' Bills of this type include the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, HR
1022 (cited in note 76); Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis Act of 1995, HR 690,
104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 25, 1995); Restructuring a Limited Government Act, HR 1923,
104th Cong, 1st Sess (June 22, 1995); Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S
343, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2, 1995) in 141 Cong Rec S2056 (Feb 2, 1995).
'o See Superfund Reform Act of 1995, HR 228, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 4, 1995)
(comprehensive reform of Superfimd, including provisions for ranking hazards).
91 See Department of Energy Risk Management Act of 1995, S 333, 104th Cong, 1st
Sess (Feb 2, 1995) (requiring risk assessment procedures).
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may be quantifiable in monetary terms. Particular difficulties
arise with respect to endangered species and passive-use environ-
mental benefits. However, requiring that the agency administra-
tor find that the benefits to society exceed the costs, including
both monetized and nonmonetized variables, would at least cast
the regulatory policy decision in an appropriate light. True, such
a standard loses the bright-line status of a monetary benefit-cost
test. However, the advantage gained is that the benefit-cost anal-
ysis will indeed be truly comprehensive and reflect all the perti-
nent effects on society.2
The third critical provision of the regulatory reform legisla-
tion pertains to risk assessment. Rather than relying on upper-
bound risk assessment values, agencies would be required to
present information regarding mean levels of risks. Moreover, if
agencies nevertheless supplied upper-bound values, they would
also be required to provide lower-bound values so that
policymakers could assess the extent of the risk range.93 Since
the lower bound of the risk range is frequently zero risk,
policymakers could better distinguish the hazards that are truly
present from those that are more speculative.94
These three components alone could constitute a sweeping
regulatory reform bill that would put regulatory policy on sound
analytic footing. However, the current regulatory reform propos-
als go well beyond these simple provisions, as various members
of Congress pursue complex analytical and institutional changes.
Certain provisions are more attractive than others, but apparent-
ly no combination has yet done the trick; the new Congress has
yet to pass a regulatory reform bill.
VI. THE FAiLURE OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Congress's inability to pass a regulatory reform bill to date
may reflect the proposed legislation's overly ambitious scale and
its inclusion of some provisions designed, perhaps in part, to
' Including nonmonetized effects in the benefit-cost analysis may make court chal-
lenges to regulatory decisions more difficult, but the OMB can provide a countervailing
influence to promote sound judgments. The OMB has fostered a benefit-cost approach
throughout its existence, and restructuring the regulatory legislation to strengthen the
OMB's role would promote greater balance in regulatory policies.
' These provisions are included, for example, in HR 1022 § 105(1) at H2263 (cited in
note 76).
A prominent example of an agency including zero within the risk range is the risk
reported by the CPSC from urea formaldehyde foam insulation exposures. See Viscusi,
Regulating Consumer Product Safety at 99-101 (cited in note 78).
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obstruct rather than reform regulation. In many respects, this
experience is reminiscent of that at the start of the Reagan ad-
ministration, when regulatory reform became synonymous with
cost relief for industry.95 Whereas the Reagan reforms were of-
ten case-specific and generally did not alter the structure of regu-
latory policy, the more recent reform efforts have had a more
structural focus. However, in many cases, these institutional
reforms are neither essential nor compelling from an economic
standpoint.
Consider, for example, HR 1022, the Risk Assessment and
Cost-Benefit Act of 1995."6 This bill is one of the more ambitious
omnibus regulatory reform proposals. It includes a supermandate
provision and requires benefit-cost tests and unbiased risk as-
sessments. However, the bill also includes a great deal more.
Some of the provisions simply elaborate on the substantive
aspects of the analysis to be undertaken. For example, the bill
requires that the agency consider substitution risks in assessing
a regulation's total net effect on risk.97 In other instances, the
bill imposes requirements that would appear to be self-evident
given the legislation itself, such as provisions pertaining to re-
search and training in risk assessment.98
Perhaps most striking are the provisions that are unneces-
sary given the existence of a benefit-cost test. If benefit-cost
guidelines are followed, an approach that focuses on the risk
level alone-at best a partial test-is inferior to the more com-
prehensive approach that considers both risks and costs. Given
this fact, two components of the legislation seem both redundant
and second-best alternatives to the included benefit-cost test: the
first requires that agencies provide risk comparisons to put the
risk level in context;99 the second requires the agency to under-
take a comparative risk analysis in its effort to set priorities."°
Such efforts are misguided because agencies should not necessar-
ily select the regulation that addresses the greatest risks. Rather,
they should select those targets of regulation that offer the great-
est spread between benefits and costs.
" For a critique and review of the Reagan regulatory reform efforts, see Viscusi,
Fatal Tradeoffs at 248-92 (cited in note 4).
' See generally HR 1022 (cited in note 76).
9 Id § 105(4) at 112263.
Id § 108 at 112263.
99 Id § 105(3) at H2263.
1- Id § 109 at 112263-64.
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One of the main reasons why agency critics have targeted
policies that address minor risks is that if legislative mandates
make risk the main currency of interest, policy debates will fol-
low that dimension. However, once the policy debate is broadened
to include a reasoned balancing of benefits and costs, myopic
attention to risk levels alone seems overly narrow.
Other possibly burdensome features of the current regulatory
reform legislation include process reforms. Regulatory agencies
would be required to prepare plans on how they were generating
new risk information,'01 to provide reports to Congress on prior-
ity setting,0 2 and to provide more general reports to Congress
on their regulatory efforts.' Comprehensive thinking about
regulatory performance and policies is potentially instructive, but
frequently these efforts involve little more than symbolic exercis-
es that needlessly divert agency resources from the tasks at
hand. The key issue is whether Congress would use this informa-
tion constructively. If the benefits of regulatory policies in fact
exceed costs, as documented in the regulatory impact analyses
and reviewed by the OMB, then there is greater reason for confi-
dence that new regulations will be much more cost-justified than
those adopted to date.
Perhaps the greatest controversy concerns the proposed new
stages of regulatory policy review. The first stage is peer review
by panels of scientific experts; such review would be required for
regulations imposing major costs.' T Introducing another layer
of regulatory review will, however, delay new regulations.' 5 By
increasing the OMB's scientific capabilities and creating a perma-
nent institutional base with such expertise, a thorough scientific
review of regulatory proposals would be possible under the cur-
rent system. Avoiding formal peer review would also address
concerns that society will suffer environmental or risk costs dur-
ing the delays occasioned by the review.
The final set of provisions, pertaining to judicial review, is
particularly controversial and raises the prospect that the courts
may delay many regulatory proposals.' To the extent that
101 Id § 501 at H2265.
1- Id § 601 at H2265.
'03 Id § 107(B) at H2263.
o See, for example, id § 301 at H2264-65.
106 Based on the author's current experience in serving on two EPA Science Advisory
Boards, he does not have a great deal of confidence in the expeditiousness of the peer
review process.
" The judicial review provisions are the subject of HR 1022 § 401 at H2265 (cited in
1996] 1459
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1459 1996
The University of Chicago Law Review
nonmonetary benefit-cost components are included in the analy-
sis, judicial review may focus on ambiguous policy criteria. Turn-
ing the courts into venues of economic inquiry also presumes a
degree of economic expertise that courts currently lack. Instead
of dealing with these issues in the courts, the OMB and its staff
of regulatory overseers could provide the needed institutional
check on misguided regulatory policies once the criteria for regu-
lations were altered. 107 It should also be noted that adding judi-
cial review provisions may encourage legal challenges. However,
even without these provisions, which are a red flag to opponents,
one can always challenge regulatory actions in court if they vio-
late the agency's legislative mandate. Therefore, highlighting the
potential for judicial challenges through special provisions in
reform legislation may be unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, analysts have devoted considerable attention
to devising policy analysis approaches that would enable
policymakers to eliminate the most undesirable regulations with-
out violating legislative prohibitions against benefit-cost balanc-
ing. Risk-risk analysis and its variants that consider the mortali-
ty consequences of regulatory expenditures are perhaps the most
visible policy assessment techniques of this type. Such circuitous
mechanisms for eliminating undesirable regulations are poten-
tially useful in trimming the least productive efforts. However,
until an assessment of the overall beneficial and adverse effects
of regulation becomes the guideline for regulatory policy deci-
sions, these choices will necessarily fall short of what is attain-
able.
A single comprehensive bill could eliminate the inefficiencies
stemming from a variety of restrictive legislative mandates. Leg-
islation that includes benefit-cost tests, principles of honest risk
assessment, and a supermandate provision would provide the
necessary legislative counterpart to augment the OMB's regula-
tory oversight. Including extraneous features and imposing ex-
panded institutional requirements that could delay vital regulato-
note 76).
"' Justice Breyer, for example, advocates establishing an elite civil service corps who
would develop expertise in regulatory analysis issues, including both science and econom-
ics. Such a professional group committed to regulatory analysis and review is likely to be
better positioned than courts to make other policy judgments. See Breyer, Breaking the
Vicious Circle at 59-81 (cited in note 62).
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ry improvements may distract attention from the central task of
revamping the fundamental criteria for setting regulatory policy.
Society currently commits hundreds of billions of dollars each
year to risk and environmental regulations. It is time that we de-
mand an honest return on our risk reduction investment.
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